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Abstract 
The right to privacy is the right to obscure or hide parts of an individual’s life from the view 
of the wider public. An individual right to privacy is seen as a fundamental human right within 
the wider context of international law.  In the age of surveillance from the state and private 
internet communications companies, for an individual to protect their privacy or to remain 
obscure is now becoming almost impossible.  A renewed emphasis on the right to privacy 
influenced in direct response to the aftermath of the Edward Snowden and Cambridge 
Analytica revelations. The protection of privacy and the international community must address 
not only the practices of state sponsored surveillance but also surveillance undertaken by 
modern private communications companies. This article will focus on how the international 
community and international law is protecting the privacy of the individual in an increasingly 
fast moving area of rights protection and technological advancement.  




The right to privacy is a fundamental human right enshrined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR)1 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).2 The right to privacy is now being see as of greater importance in light of the Edward 
Snowden revelations in 2013 and Cambridge Analytica in 2018. The international community 
is now focused on addressing not only the practices of state sponsored surveillance but also 
surveillance undertaken by modern communications companies.3  Even though there has been 
some improvement in this area, the protection of individuals privacy remains ambiguous. 
The basis of the protection by the international community and the United Nations is the 
application and interpretation of Article 17 of the ICCPR and more recently in the United 
Nations Resolution on Privacy in the Digital Age.4 The basis of the privacy protection debate 
is how to bring surveillance practices in line with human rights law and what privacy now 
means in the modern digital age.  International law in essence holds states accountable for their 
actions (not in all cases) based on the effective control test.5   
However now there needs to be an international legal solution not only to the behaviour of 
states, sometimes referred to as the Five Eyes6 states but also by communication based private 
companies such as Facebook. Activities which use surveillance into individual’s digital 
movement without an individual’s permission is clearly in breach of Article 17 of the ICCPR.  





International law is trying to play catch up to try and regulate the growing concern for privacy 
protection as the international community has overall been slow in responding to changes in 
modern technologies, especially those that are based on communication and data collection.  
Article 17 of the ICCPR 1966 sets out privacy as the following:  
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation.  
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.  
In 1988 this was further expanded in General Comment No 16 on Article 17 ICCPR.7 This 
Comment explained: 
1. Article 17 provides for the right of every person to be protected against arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence as well as 
against unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. In the view of the Committee 
this right is required to be guaranteed against all such interferences and attacks whether 
they emanate from State authorities or from natural or legal persons. The obligations 
imposed by this article require the State to adopt legislative and other measures to give 
effect to the prohibition against such interferences and attacks as well as to the 
protection of this right.  
2. In this connection, the Committee wishes to point out that in the reports of States 
parties to the Covenant the necessary attention is not being given to information 
concerning the manner in which respect for this right is guaranteed by legislative, 
administrative or judicial authorities, and in general by the competent organs 
established in the State. In particular, insufficient attention is paid to the fact that article 
17 of the Covenant deals with protection against both unlawful and arbitrary 
interference. That means that it is precisely in State legislation above all that provision 
must be made for the protection of the right set forth in that article. At present the 
reports either say nothing about such legislation or provide insufficient information on 
the subject.  
In 1966 the ICCPR was not adequately sufficient in scope to ascertain the threat to individual 
privacy from digital and data collection technologies because these technologies did not exist.  
The definition contained within the 1966 document is therefore is considered too narrow in 
today’s technological advances in communication and data collection to be a full formed 
definition of the protection of privacy.  
The 1988 General Comment only goes a little further to distinguish the incoming threat of data 
collection by states and the protection of states from individual’s private data being interfered 
with.  However, a full appreciation of technologies concerning communication and information 
were not fully appreciated as these technologies were only at their infancy.  
The international community and the United Nations needs to look at updating the definition 
within the context of the modern digital age. This general discussion has been enhanced by the 
appointment of the United Nations Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue8, whose sole aim is to 





The General Comment to Article 179 states that ‘the gathering and holding of personal 
information on computers, databanks and other devices by public authorities or private bodies 
must be regulated by law.’10  Article 17 guidelines have also been agreed upon by the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC)11 and has been followed in a number of European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) decisions.   
Can we really keep ourselves private? 
 
Privacy could be argued to be an essential human right as well as an essential human need. All 
individuals need the knowledge to understand that certain elements of their lives can be 
obscured or kept private, away from others.  In the digital age with the constant reliance on 
digital communication, do we really have the right to keep ourselves obscured, or are we part 
of the process which gives up the notion of privacy?   
 
Post has suggested the following: 
 
‘Privacy is a value so complex so entangled in competing and contradictory 
dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings that I sometimes despair 
whether it can be usefully addressed at all.’12 
 
Rengel explained that: 
 
‘The concept of privacy involves a definition of what it entails as well and how it is 
valued, while the right to privacy refers to the recognition that privacy should be legally 
protected.’13 
 
Privacy has consistently been defined in the context of personal autonomy or having the innate 
control over the personal intimacies or having control over the personal data which is available 
about oneself.14 At its core privacy is about the protection of oneself from the outside world. 
 
This need for obscurity or privacy can also be described as ‘claim of individuals, groups or 
institutions to determine for themselves when how and to what extent information about them 
is communicated to others’15 or ‘privacy is the condition of human life in which acquaintance 
with a person or with affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited.’16 
 
Solove has put privacy into six different concepts: 
 
(1) The right to be left alone. 
(2) Limited access to the self, the ability to shield oneself from unwanted access by others.  
(3) Secrecy, the concealment of certain matters from others 
(4) Control over personal information, the ability to exercise control over information 
about oneself. 
(5) Personhood, the protection of ones’ personality, individuality and dignity and; 
(6) Intimacy, control over or limited access to ones’ intimate relationships or aspects of 
life.17 
 
Solove’s categories are a common sense approach to privacy that most individuals would agree 
that on some level all human beings need the right to be left alone.  However, the problem 
exists in that some individuals will value some privacy actions over others. Some for example 
may not value intimacy as an important protection. This can be seen in the use of Instagram to 






Solove’s own unique definition of privacy is the following: 
 
‘The value of privacy must be determined on the basis of its importance to society, 
not in terms of individual rights. Moreover, privacy does not have universal value that 
is the same across all contexts. The value of privacy in a particular context depends 
upon the social importance activities that it facilitates.’18 
Here, Solove is contextualising privacy, privacy which needs to change with time and maybe 
what privacy means to individuals and not the wider world’s interpretation of it. This must and 
should be the basis of how the international community must view privacy. Newell went further 
and suggested that privacy can described in as a number of different protective rights, from 
control over personal information, freedom from surveillance, protection from invasions into 
someone’s home, personal autonomy and control over one’s body.19 
The traditional right to privacy before the onset of the digital age presupposes that human 
interaction will often take place in the public sphere. This means that an individual will only 
give up their personal space when they feel safe to so and a right to be obscure is much easier 
to ascertain. In cyberspace obscurity is much more difficult to obtain. It has been stated that a 
right to obscurity in the digital age is not much more than a desirable goal and has little chance 
of being achieved in the reality.20 Obscurity can be described as a ‘state of unknowing or being 
unidentifiable online’.21 Out in the public space it is impossible for an observer to identify 
someone’s identity or personal data because they do not have the correct pieces of this personal 
puzzle to fit together as they do not have access to any personal information. For example, an 
observer who observes a conversation will be unlikely to ascertain any personal information 
about the individuals taking part in the conversation simply by observing them in a public 
space.   
Online obscurity is much more complex; a person can remain obscure if a piece of vital 
personal information is missing like identity or social connections. However, with some of 
these vital personal pieces fitting together, like for example social connections, the online 
observer can, if they have right tools, infiltrate private information much easier than if they 
were observing a conversation taken place in a public space.   
Obscurity therefore, would only be fully realised through regulation that protects an 
individual’s information in which they wish to keep private. Therefore, if a right to privacy has 
been recognised within international treaties and national domestic legislation then surely 
obscurity is just another function of privacy. 
Hartzog and Strutzman have suggested other frameworks that could lead to a protection of 
obscurity and protection of privacy on the internet.22 They have suggested that the protection 
of obscurity may be easier to implement than that of a pure privacy recognition due in the main 
to the problematic nature of a widely accepted definition of a right to privacy. This would mean 
in essence instead of regulating websites to remove sensitive information, courts could propose 
some element of obscurity i.e. the individual must specifically mandate what information is to 
be made visible. 
However, this still puts the individual information received and what to do with it in the hands 
of the receiving company, the trust of the company not to expose personal or sensitive personal 
information. In light of Cambridge Analytica this seems problematic.  What is needed is a 





Hartzog and Strutzman suggested four factors which could be used by the courts to determine 
whether some aspects should be deemed private or public. They suggested that if certain 
elements were missing from the public then they are closer to being obscure and should come 
with some element of a protection of privacy attached to them. These factors suggested are: 
(1) Search visibility (ease of discovery in search systems) 
(2) Unprotected access (degree of access restriction) 
(3) Identification (degree to which individual is identified by direct or indirect disclosure) 
(4) Clarity (ability for observer to comprehend or discover information)23 
 
To expand the understanding of these four factors, Hartzog and Strutzman used the following 
scenarios: 
Scenario 1 is a blog that is visible only to invited users and is not searchable by general 
search engines like Google. It is close to being completely obscure because it is missing 
two of the most important factors for finding it. Scenario 2 is a Twitter account that 
uses only a first name and a blurry photo to identify the poster. While this information 
is more obvious than the information in Scenario 1 because it is freely searchable and 
accessible, it is still slightly obscure because only certain Internet users would be able 
to identify the poster of the content or completely comprehend any idiosyncratic 
posts.24 
Therefore, these determining factors as suggested by Hartzog and Strutzman are based on 
which elements are present for the courts to deem them to be obscure. If a social media user 
identifies themselves by their name, posts a picture of themselves online in which they are 
easily identifiable then this cannot be a case of privacy and the individual cannot presuppose 
themselves as to be trying to be obscure.  If (and it’s a big if in light of our use of 
communication apps in social media) however, elements within these four factors are missing 
as in the scenarios used above, then the court could determine that there was an element of 
obscurity intended to be observed by the individual. 
Both the right to obscurity and the right to privacy are interlinked but are not helped by the 
current international guidelines not being clear enough on the protection of these rights. But 
clear guidelines on obscurity in the definition of what is private and what is public could help 
in making the protection and what should be protected much clearer. 
 
The law and the protection of privacy 
 
The guiding statement of Article 17 has been observed by a number of European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) decisions.  The ECtHR’s decisions in Botta v Italy25, MK v France26, 
S and Marper v the UK27 and Bensaid v the UK28 has suggested that ‘private life is not an 
exhaustive decision.’29  These decisions have shown the difficulty in a fully formed definition 
of privacy which includes all nuances that any individual might consider private.  However, 
the ECtHR has stated that the very ‘protection of personal data is of fundamental importance 
to a person’s enjoyment of respect for his or her personal data and family life.’30 
The United Nations and the international community must also take into account the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU)`s decisions on privacy.  The landmark decision on 
privacy came in Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner.31 This case was based on a 





complaint Schrems, challenged the transfer of his data to the United States by Facebook in 
light of Facebook USA alleged involvement with the PRISM mass surveillance program.32  
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) made the Safe Harbor arrangement of 
collection and data transfer between EU and US invalid. Schrems complaint was based on EU 
data protection law, which does not allow data transfers to non-EU countries, unless the 
company transferring and storing the data can guarantee adequate protection. The Court found 
that there was not the adequate protection needed in line with the EU data protection law and 
deemed that the Safe Harbor agreement ‘must be declared invalid.’33  The Court also expressed 
that ‘legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised basis to the 
content of electronic communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.’34   
In conjunction with Article 28 of the ICCPR the Human Rights Committee (HRC) was formed 
to investigate and monitor states implementations of rights including those pursuant to 
privacy.35  The HRC issued a General Comment on Article 17 of the ICCPR embodied by 
European case law which clarifying concepts such as ‘arbitrary interference’ ‘family’ ‘home’ 
and ‘correspondence’.  Although it must be stated again that the ICCPR is unclear as to what 
is always intended by these ‘general comments’ and an overarching definition of privacy in the 
digital age.36 
However, the General Comment does state how from a legal aspect the ICCPR should be able 
to have an interpretation to the right to privacy within the scope of international law.  According 
to the HRC the term ‘unlawful’ as it appears in Article 17 set out that no one’s privacy must 
be interfered with unless reasoned by law.37 
The right to privacy is not only recognised in some of the most important international and 
regional human rights documents but they have also been recognised in almost every 
constitution in the world.  States without written constitutions like the UK for example have 
extended privacy protection through jurisprudence, procedural rules and other protections.  
Furthermore privacy has become a common element in most states.38 Although the right to 
privacy is not an absolute right and at times is infringed when other matters are at stake (for 
example public protection or criminal sanction) there is a fine act of balancing the international 
community’s inherent recognition of the right to privacy and the private act it may or may not 
protect. 
There have also been several US cases which have influenced the international legal thinking 
on privacy protection.   US courts have shown the approach of a balancing of the action taken 
by the user in determining whether the action is deemed private and obscure. In United States 
v Gines-Perez39 the Court held that a right to claim privacy is unavailable to a person if they 
place information on a public forum without taken any steps to protect the information from 
discovery from the general public.  In contrast in Pietrylo v Hillstone Restaurant Group40 and 
an employee set up a private closed network page on Myspace with invitation only to join.  The 
group was used mainly to convey frustration with their employer. When one of the managers 
obtained the password to the account, the creator of the group brought a case against the 
manager for an invasion of privacy. The Court held in favour of the infringement of privacy on 
the grounds that the group had been intended to be private and obscured from public view as it 






It is not a secret that in certain circumstances states and their governments use surveillance and 
data collection within their borders of their own territories. However, this does raise the 
question as to whether they can carry out such acts in foreign states.	
	
The ICCPR sets out in Article 2(1) ‘states must respect and to ensure’ the rights recognised in 
the treaty ‘to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.’41 The question 
of subject of under their jurisdiction raises questions of whom is under a state’s jurisdiction. 
Global surveillance within different states and different legal frameworks makes a clear 
distinction between external and internal communications. Most states (namely the Five 
Eyes42) have legislation which governs these actions. In the UK it is the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA)43, in the US it is the US Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act 197844, Australian Intelligence Services Act45 and Canadian National 
Defence Act 1985.46  
For the UK under ss.8(1) and (2) of the RIPA internal communications and surveillance data 
gathering is only permitted when a warrant is issued and only on evidence of suspicion of 
unlawful activity.47 External communications are defined as communication sent or received 
outside the territory of the British Islands.48   
The invasion of privacy, which is in contrast with the ICCPR, is that the conditions of evidence 
and warrant set out s.8 (1) and (2) do not apply to external communications. This controversial 
element, is that all activities of UK residents through digital communications platforms such 
as Google, Twitter and Facebook, can be intercepted by the UK governmental state agencies 
as their headquarters are outside a British territory, in this instance the United States.49  This 
therefore, gives the UK government through its intelligence gathering agencies permission to 
use all these communications which are coming in and out of the UK by UK residents.  Another 
caveat to this is that under a general warrant under s. 8(4) RIPA 2000 both residents of the UK 
and foreign nationals can have their communications monitored. 
The controversial nature of this was commented on by the HRC in a 2015 report in which it 
commented the following50: 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) that makes a distinction between 
internal and external communications, provides for untargeted warrants for the 
interception of external private communications and communication data, which are 
sent or received outside the United Kingdom without affording the same safeguards as 
in the case of interception of internal communications….the UK must review the 
regime regulating the interception of personal communications and retention of 
communication data with the view to ensuring that such activities both within and 
outside the State party, conform to its obligations under the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights including Article 17.51 
However, despite this request from the United Nations, the UK made no concession on this 
point.  The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 under s 136(3) still allows for surveillance by their 
security forces to issue mass warrants to intercept ‘overseas related communications.’52  
Many states seem to absolve themselves from the obligations placed on them by ICCPR. The 
US government has refuted the obligation placed on it by ICCPR stating it is not bound by it.  
The US ratified the ICCPR in 1992. Therefore, the US concludes that it is not legally bound to 
comply with ICCPR in respect to any surveillance operations over non-US communications 
systems or activities which are not based within the US. This position asserts that the US states 





are when an individual is both within a state’s territory and subject to its jurisdiction. Therefore, 
if these two conditions are not satisfied, it can be suggested, that the foreign individual 
concerned does not benefit from privacy protection under the ICCPR.53   
In the UK, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) has looked at the issue of the UK’s 
international law obligations and human rights protections of individual privacy in Human 
Rights Watch v Secretary of State.54 The Court here was concerned with the interception, 
storage and use of information and communications by the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ). The case concerned a group of UK residents and a group of individuals 
that were not residing in the UK. Regarding the question of the rights to privacy for the 
individuals not residing in the UK the court expressed that ‘under Article 8 of the [European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)] the UK owes no obligation to persons who are situated 
outside its territory in respect of electronic communications between them which passes 
through the state.’55  
The IPT when investigating, therefore, considered two issues in relation to infringement of 
privacy. The first issue of standing (whether such an individual could make a claim from being 
directly affected) the tribunal decided that all the applicants had standing if they could provide 
the information necessary for the investigation. The controversial element was the second issue 
of extraterritorial application of the ECHR. The Tribunal concluded that the ECHR was not 
applicable to individuals living abroad even if they have been the subject to surveillance by the 
state. 
Extraterritorial application concerns the issue of whether the ECHR applies to individuals 
abroad and whether states owe human rights protection to those individuals living outside their 
territory.56 This discussion is concerned with the interpretation of the term ‘jurisdiction’ within 
the ECHR. The IPT therefore was submitting the question that is an individual under the 
jurisdiction of the UK if they have been under surveillance by the state but the individual is not 
domiciled within the UK. 
The controversial issue of extraterritorial application decision by the IPT strikes at the very 
center of the right to privacy. Communications via the digital medium do not have respect for 
national borders and neither do digital communication companies or state government.  Logic 
would suggest that the right to privacy should not be depended on an individual’s location and 
whether they are protected by article 8 of the ECHR or under the ICCPR.  The findings in 
Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State have been controversial and have been heavily 
criticized.57  
 
International law must protect privacy by looking at the obligations on who is controlling 
individual communications not the effective control over physical areas or physical individuals. 
Nyst58 argues that instead of looking at control as in physical control of territory, it must be 
looked at in terms of when data or communications are intercepted within that states territory, 
the state in question should be bound by rights obligations to those individuals regardless of 
their location.  Nyst makes a suggestion that this is an ‘interface-based jurisdiction,’ that a state 
is not allowed to ‘interfere with communications that passes through its territorial borders.’59 
 
The bigger picture here is not just about the protected right of interference of communication 
and storing of data, but there is also the issue of collusion and the sharing of personal data 
between states which makes the obligation and protection of privacy so difficult to police 
against. The agreements between the US and other states allows governments to simply engage 





except British nationals61 and the NSA through the PRISM surveillance program is allowed to 
spy on anyone that is not American.62  
 
The PRISM program allows the NSA to collect communication from US internet 
communications companies. The collection of this data is governed by Section 702 FISA 
Amendments Act 2008 which allows communication data, encrypted data and search entries 
from companies such as Google, Yahoo and Microsoft to be transferred to the NSA.63 
 
The documents leaked by Edward Snowden suggested that PRISM is ‘the number one source 
of raw intelligence area for the NSA analytic reports and makes up approximately 91% of NSA 
internet acquired data.64 The US government has defended the use of PRISM stating that is can 
only be used on US nationals with a warrant and it has prevented acts of Terrorism.65 
 
Then the data information collected by GCHQ and the NSA is shared between the two agencies 
and therefore enables each agency to circumvent any national restrictions that are in place 
protecting its own citizens right to privacy, as they are able to access this information that has 
been gathered on their own citizens by foreign governmental agencies.66   
 
 
 International law and the future of privacy 
 
The international community has taken steps to look at enhancing the protection of privacy 
since the adoption of the ICCPR in 1966 and the subsequent HRC’s adoption of General 
Comment No 16 on the right to privacy in 1988.67 These steps do include a focus on human 
rights and surveillance practices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN 
Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression and Counter-Terrorism. The adoption of both 
UN General Assembly Resolutions and the UN Human Rights Council Resolutions on the right 
to privacy showed a focus on the issues by the international community. The 2015 creation of 
a UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy shows the focus on international importance 
of privacy. The HRC has also addressed surveillance legislation in its Concluding Observations 
to States.  Also, the ECtHR, the CJEU and the Inter-American Commission and Court on 
Human Rights have developed a jurisprudence on right to privacy. 
 
Of course there is a strong argument that these steps are not progressive enough. Most of these 
advancements can be seen as mainly regional agreements or soft law without any real binding 
obligations on states for the protection of privacy. 
 
However, some of these wider international community discussions and advancements in the 
need to protect privacy have started to influence the legal framework of states intrusion into an 
individual’s privacy. Canada’s decision to stop the sharing of intelligence data with its Five 
Eyes partners was in direct response to the evidence of the unlawful surveillance of 
Canadians.68 In 2014 the German Parliamentary Committee investigating the spy scandal 
involving the National Security Agency (NSA) has led to a lessening of the cooperation 
between the Federal Intelligence Agency (BND) and the NSA.69  Also, there has been an 
increase in privacy cases in the German Courts.70 
 
There has also been the proposition of more progressive data protection laws in the US.  There 
have been two main proposals, consisting of the Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act 
(COPRA) and United States Consumer Data Privacy Act of 2019 (CDPA).  This legislation 





had been infringed.  There have also been a number of proposals at federal level, including 
Online Privacy Act, Designing Accounting Safeguards to Help Broaden Oversight and 
Regulations on Data (DASHBOARD), American Data Dissemination Act (ADD Act), Social 
Media Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2019 and the Privacy Bill of Rights 
Act.71 
 
The UN has reaffirmed its commitment to the question of the protection of data in the digital 
age in Human Rights Council Resolution adopted in 2017 which reaffirmed its commitment to 
the issue by reaffirming many privacy issues that had previously been decided. 
 
In 2015 via Resolution 28/16 the UN Human Rights Council decided to appoint after 
international community interest in the OHCHR Report into privacy a Special Rapporteur on 
the right to privacy for a period of three years.72 The resolution directed the Special Rapporteur 
to report on alleged violations of the right to privacy including, in particular the concerns 
arising from new technologies. With this mandate in mind all member states were urged to 
cooperate fully with the office of the Special Rapporteur. 
 
The main findings from the Special Rapporteur can be seen in the Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to privacy from 27 February 2019.73 In the report the Special 
Rapporteur states that the ‘right to privacy can facilitate the enjoyment of other human rights. 
Equally its infringements constrain the enjoyment of other human rights.’74 The report is 
critical of the states not taking seriously the regulations on privacy that they have signed up to 
stating: ‘there are several historical examples of Member States ratifying international 
instruments on human rights while lacking the genuine will to take the necessary measures for 
their implementation.’75 An example is former German Democratic Republic who signed the 
ICCPR in 1973 but was still openly using a surveillance regime against its citizens. The report 
went on to state that today there were similar contradictions.  Many states commit themselves 
to protecting the right to privacy but are also acting in ways which puts the very protection of 
privacy at risk.76 
 
The report used a Sieghart quote to explain that the right to privacy is integral to personal 
autonomy, the links between privacy, information flows, autonomy and power exist.77  Sieghart 
suggests the following: 
 
‘In a society where modern information technology is developing fast, many others 
may be able to find out how we act. And that, in turn, may reduce our freedom to act 
as we please – because once others discover how we act, they may think that it is in 
their interest, or in the interest of society, or even in our own interest to dissuade us, 
discourage us, or even stopping us from doing what we want to do, and seek to 
manipulate us to do what they want to do.’78 
 
The above position the Special Rapporteur linked to privacy in the following way79: 
 
‘Shorn of the cloak of privacy that protects him, an individual becomes transparent and 
therefore manipulable. A manipulable individual is at the mercy of those who control 
the information held about him, and his freedom, which is often relative at best, shrinks 
in direct proportion to the extent of the nature of the options and alternatives which are 






The report therefore clearly sets out the importance of the protection of privacy and it states 
‘infringing upon privacy is often part of a system which threatens other liberties.’81 The report 
also reaffirmed the position of the HRC`s resolution of March 201782 that ‘States should ensure 
that any interference with the right to privacy is consistent with the principles of legality, 
necessity and proportionality.’83 
 
The main privacy recommendations of the report included the following84: 
 
47. The incorporation by UN Member States into their domestic legal system of the 
standards and safeguards set out in Convention 108+ Article 1185, for the protection of 
the fundamental right to privacy, especially: 
 
 (a) the creation of legal certainty by ensuring that any and all privacy-intrusive 
measures. 
(b) the establishment of the test of “a necessary and proportionate measure in a 
democratic society”. 
(c) the establishment of one or more independent oversight authorities empowered by 
law and adequately resourced by the State. 
 
48. (a) All UN Member States should amend their laws to empower their independent 
authorities entrusted with oversight of intelligence activities, to specifically and 
explicitly, oversight of all personal information exchanged between the intelligence 
agencies of the countries for which they are responsible. 
 
The Special Rapporteur again expressed the importance of the right to privacy for individuals 
within the international community: 
 
102. The confidence of individuals to share ideas and to assemble is also fundamental 
to the health of societies and democracy. The loss of privacy can lead to a loss of this 
confidence including confidence in Government and institutions established to 
represent the public interests, withdrawal from participation, which can adversely 
impact and undermine representative democracies. 
 
103. While privacy rights are not costless, or free of risks to governments, the 
challenges are outweighed by our collective interest in democracy. The right to privacy 
for women, as well as children and individuals of diverse sexual orientations, gender 
identities, gender expressions and sex characteristics, is critically important for all of 
the reasons outlined above and reported in submissions.  
 
108. Transparency is needed in how private companies use personal data of users, and 
respond to reports of online harassment. Greater gender diversity among those shaping 
online experiences is important for making products and platforms safer, more socially-
responsible and accountable. 86   
 
Therefore, throughout, the findings of the Special Rapporteur and specifically the 
recommendations and conclusions from the report that the right to privacy is an area which 
needs the cooperation of states within the UN to insure that individual`s privacy or the obscurity 









Individuals place a great deal of importance on the notion or essence of individual privacy. 
There is an inherent right of the individual to protect one’s personal and private thoughts and 
actions. What an individual considers to be private is a question of interpretation.  There is also 
a very real link between the need for privacy and the connection to dignity as human beings. 
 
The need to protect this right is something which is becoming increasingly important and 
increasingly difficult within the digital age. The difficulty comes in the fact that much of our 
protected privacy is now within the digital sphere, making the protection from surveillance and 
intrusion from the state and private communications companies much harder to regulate. 
 
The very general right to privacy can be recognised as the following: 
 
‘Privacy is a fundamental human right that has been defined as the presumption that 
individuals should have an area of autonomous development, interaction and liberty, a 
‘private sphere’ with or without interaction with others and free from state intervention 
and free from excessive unsolicited intervention by other uninvited individuals.’87 
 
The evidence that the right to privacy is now considered to be within the higher scope of 
international law can be seen by its protected status within several international law doctrines 
and within international customary law.   
 
The legal definition of a right to privacy needs to be a continuous and fluid process. The 
development and advances of new technology means that this area needs to be constantly 
adaptable to change. These developments will constantly make the application and protection 
of the need of an individual’s privacy much more complex. As technology advances the 
temptation of states to use the technology to gather individual data becomes greater. 
 
The current legal framework in international law is at times unclear. The UN through the 
Special Rapporteur is clear in reinforcing the rights protected under the ICCPR, UDHR, HRC`s 
General Comment no 17 and others but states are, especially through the Five-Eye states 
infringing individual rights, collecting data on individuals and using such data without 
permission. 
 
However, complex the notion of privacy is, a fundamental right to be left alone or the right to 
obscurity, even though difficult, it is the responsibility of the law itself and in particular 
international law in protecting the individual and their privacy from interference by private 
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